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"Undoubtedly judicial disfavor of these covenants is provoked by
'powerful considerations of public policy which militate against
sanctioning the loss of a (person's) livelihood. '"
As most sports fans know, the National Collegiate Athletic
Association enforces a variety of rules that sports law academicians refer
to as "anti-transfer rules." While this body of rules is quite complex, the
gist of them is that certain athletes who transfer from one Division I school
to another must "sit out" a year before participating in athletics. This
article contends that the rules are preposterous.
" Ray Yasser is a law professor at the University of Tulsa College of Law. Clay Fees is a former high
school baseball coach and current law student who plans to graduate in May 2005. The authors
would like to thank Don Tomkalski, Jason West, and Alex Parker of the University of Tulsa Athletic
Department for answering innumerable questions and providing invaluable information vital to the
completion of this project. We would also like to thank University of Tulsa law student Emily
Maxwell for her aid in this endeavor.
1. Reed, Roberts Assoc., Inc. v. Strauman, 353 N.E.2d 590, 593 (N.Y. 1976).
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Placing the rules in any other collegiate context reveals their absurdity.
Imagine telling a budding young, theater student at Harvard that if she
transfers to Yale, she would be ineligible to participate in any dramatic
production her first year at Yale. Also imagine telling a coach who takes a
new job that he or she must stay off the sidelines or bench for a season.
Despite their preposterousness, no one has yet mounted a successful
challenge to these rules. This article lays out the case for a successful
legal attack against the NCAA's anti-transfer rules based upon the well-
developed body of law dealing with "covenants not to compete.",
2
Part I of this article describes the complex body of anti-transfer rules.
Part II examines a recent case that challenges the anti-transfer rules on an
antitrust law theory.3 Although the plaintiff was unsuccessful, the case
provides a good backdrop upon which to design a successful hypothetical
case against the rules. Part III explores the law relating to restrictive
covenants generally. Part IV applies that body of law to a hypothetical
case brought by an aggrieved athlete. Part V examines the world of
intercollegiate athletics in the wake of the successful attack.
I. THE ANTI-TRANSFER RULES
By most accounts, athletic talent' is the key to a successful athletic
program. Quality athletes render programs successful. With success
comes exposure and publicity. This in turn has the potential to generate
revenue through alumni donations, ticket sales, marketing promotions, and
lucrative television contracts. Increased revenue can translate into
improvements in facilities that in turn can lure a greater number of talented
athletes. Thus, the upward spiral continues. Note that it is the athlete who
is the engine of this success. Athletes play and win the games.
The recruitment of athletic talent is therefore highly significant.
Colleges and universities vigorously compete for the best athletes.
Athletes are convinced to attend a particular school by myriad reasons:
quality of facilities, quality of coaching, academic reputation, historical
success, the possibility of substantial playing time, the number of games
on television, and proximity to home, just to name a few. "Recruiting"
athletic talent is a key ingredient for success at the highest levels of
2. The idea for this article arose out of a classroom discussion in a Law of Amateur Sports
class taught by Professor Yasser during the fall of 2003. Classroom discussion focused upon the
possible theories utilized by athletes to attack NCAA rules. Clay Fees, a student in the class at the
time, made the point that the anti-transfer rules operated somewhat like covenants not to compete.
He was encouraged by Professor Yasser to pursue the idea by writing a short "think piece." The two
then decided to expand the think piece into a law review article. This article is a collaborative effort
that builds upon Fees' initial idea.




The National Collegiate Athletic Association, commonly known as the
NCAA, oversees much of the highly competitive world of college
athletics. The NCAA is a voluntary association of about 1,200 colleges
and universities, athletic conferences, and sports organizations devoted to
the sound administration of intercollegiate athletics. From its headquarters
in Indianapolis, Indiana, the NCAA is chiefly responsible for the
regulation of athletic competition among its members. The NCAA has
three divisions: Division I, Division II and Division III; membership in a
particular division depends on a variety of factors, including the number of
sports the individual school offers, and whether athletic scholarships are
available. In football, Division I is divided into Division I-A and Division
I-AA. Division I is composed of the major athletic powers in the country,
as well as many other institutions that choose to compete at the major
college level.4
The NCAA purports to promote sportsmanship and academic
achievement. At the same time, the organization seeks to ensure a
competitive balance within divisions among its members.5 An essential
component of the public appeal of college athletics (indeed all athletics) is
the uncertain outcome of the competitive events. If all the best athletes
gather together on one team, the outcome is much more certain. As this
reasoning goes, dynasties are undesirable. It is the drama of uncertainty
that sparks the public's interest.
The NCAA has established guidelines for all aspects of college
athletics, including the regulation of the accumulation of athletic talent.
For example, the NCAA imposes roster limits to ensure that schools
cannot stockpile athletic talent. Talent is to be dispersed. Similarly, the
NCAA establishes scholarship maximums by sport. For example, the
maximum number of scholarships that may be awarded for Division I
basketball is thirteen.6
The NCAA also tightly governs the eligibility of athletes. These rules
are set out under Article 14 of the NCAA bylaws. The rationale for the
establishment of rules governing eligibility is "to promote competitive
equity among institutions."7 Article 14 sets up guidelines that determine
eligibility requirements for high school seniors, junior college transfers,
4. RAY YASSER ET AL., SPORTS LAW-CASES AND MATERIALS 2-3 (5TH ed. 2003).
5. NAT'L COLLEGIATE ATHLETIC ASS'N, 2003-04 NCAA DIVISION I MANUAL:
CONSTITUTION art. 2.10 (2003), available at http://www.ncaa.org/library/membership/
division i manual/index.html (last visited Apr. 3, 2005) [hereinafter "NCAA CONST."].
6. NAT'L COLLEGIATE ATHLETIC ASS'N, 2003-04 NCAA DviSION I MANUAL: OPERATING
BYLAWS art. 15.5.4 (2003), available at http://www.ncaa.org/library/membership/division_
imanual/index.html (last visited Apr. 3, 2005) [hereinafter "NCAA BYLAWS"].
7. NCAA CONST., supra note 5, at art. 2.12.
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and foreign students. Broad in scope, Article 14 governs everything from
the eligibility of pregnant athetesi to the residence requirements of
athletes enrolled in night school.9
Article 14.5 governs the transfer of athletes from one member school
to another. The general rule' is that while a transferring athlete may
freely transfer to another school, the ability of that athlete to compete will
be contingent on the athlete satisfying a one-year academic residency
requirement." In effect, the rule requires athletes who transfer to sit out a
year before becoming eligible for competitive participation.' 2 The NCAA
provides a limited number of exceptions to this general rule, which are
scattered throughout the provisions of Article 14.5.
Of particular interest to the NCAA is the athlete who transfers from
one Division I program to another. This situation is governed by Article
14.5.5.2.10.' Known simply as the "One-Time Transfer Exception"
(hereinafter "anti-transfer rule"), this rule is an exception to the general
rule requiring a year of residency, and sets out the conditions under which
an athlete may transfer from one Division I program to another without
having to sit out a year. 14
8. Id. at art. 14.2.1.3.
9. NCAA BYLAWS, supra note 6, at art. 14.5.1.2.
10. Id. at art. 14.5.1. Article 14.5.1 states, in applicable part, that:
[a] transfer student from a four-year institution shall not be eligible for intercollegiate
competition at a member institution until the student has fulfilled a residence requirement
of one full academic year .(two full semesters or three full quarters) at the certifying
institution. Further, a transfer student-athlete admitted after the 12th class day may not use
that semester or quarter for the purpose of establishing residency.
Id.
11. Id. at art. 14.5.1.1. To satisfy the academic year of residence requirement under the NCAA
bylaws, a student must:
(a) Be enrolled in and complete a minimum full-time program of studies for two full
semesters or three full quarters; or
(b) Be enrolled in a minimum full-time program of studies for two full semesters or three
full quarters and pass a number of hours that is at least equal to the sum total of the
minimum load of each of the required terms. Any student-athlete (e.g., partial qualifier,
qualifier, nonqualifier, transfer student) admitted after the 12th class day may not use that
semester or quarter for the purpose of establishing residency.
Id.
12. Id.
13. NCAA BYLAWS, supra note 6, at art. 14.5.5.2.10.
14. See id. The "One-Time Transfer Exception" (hereinafter "anti-transfer rule"), provides
that: The student transfers to the certifying institution from another four-year collegiate institution,
and all of the following conditions are met (for graduate students, see also Bylaw 14.1.9.1):
(a) The student is a participant in a sport other than basketball, Division I-A football or
men's ice hockey at the institution to which the student is transferring. A participant in
Division I-AA football at the institution to which the student is transferring may utilize
this exception only if the participant transferred to the certifying institution from an
institution that sponsors Division I-A football or the participant transfers from a Division
2005] NCAA Anti-Transfer Rules
Generally, athletes may transfer from a Division I program to another
only one time, provided they meet a set of criteria. The language of the
anti-transfer rule is more than a bit perplexing. Yet, under its provisions,
athletes who participate in Division I men's or women's basketball,
Division I-A football, or men's ice hockey may not compete unless they
fulfill one year of "residency" as defined by the NCAA. 1 Participants in
all other sports are free to utilize an exception to the residency rule. In
short, for athletes who participate in Division I basketball, Division I-A
football, or ice hockey, the anti-transfer rule requires the athlete to satisfy
the NCAA's residency requirement by "sitting out" a year before engaging
in competition. 6
I-AA institution that offers athletically related financial aid in the sport of football to a
Division I-AA institution that does not offer athletically related financial aid in football;
(Revised: 1/16/93 effective 8/1/93, 1/11/94, 1/10/95, 11/1/00 effective 8/1/01)
(b) The student has not transferred previously from one four-year institution unless, in the
previous transfer, the student-athlete received an exception per Bylaw 14.5.5.2.6
(discontinued/nonsponsored sport exception); (Revised: 1/11/94, 1/11/97)
(c) The student is in good academic standing and meets the progress toward degree
requirements. The transferring student must be one who would have been academically
eligible had he or she remained at the institution from which the student transferred, and
he or she also must be eligible at the certifying institution as a regularly enrolled, full-time,
degree-seeking student who was admitted in accordance with the regular, published
entrance requirements of the institution. The student shall not be required to fulfill the
necessary percentage-of degree requirements per Bylaw 14.4.3.2 at the previous
institution; (Revised: 1/10/95, 1/9/96)
(d) If the student is transferring from an NCAA or NAIA member institution, the student's
previous institution shall certify in writing that it has no objection to the student's being
granted an exception to the transfer-residence requirement. If the student's previous
institution denies his or her request for the release, the institution shall inform the student-
athlete in writing that he or she, upon request, shall be provided a hearing conducted by an
institutional entity or committee outside of the athletics department (e.g., the office of
student affairs; office of the dean of students; or a committee composed of the faculty
athletics representative, student-athletes and nonathletics faculty/staff members). The
institution shall have established reasonable procedures for promptly hearing such a
request; and (Revised: 1/11/94, 4/26/01)
(e) If the student transfers to the certifying institution from a Division III member
institution and meets the foregoing conditions, he or she may be eligible to compete but
shall not receive athletically related financial aid during the first academic year in
residence at the certifying institution.
Id.
15. See NCAA BYLAWS, supra note 6, at art. 14.5.1.1(a).
16. The NCAA grants waivers to the residency requirement in limited circumstances. Pursuant
to Article 5.4.1.4 of the NCAA Constitution, a school may appeal an application of the NCAA
legislation to the Administrative Review Subcommittee. NCAA CONST., supra note 5, at art. 5.4.1.4.
According to the NCAA's Administrative Review Subcommittee Waiver Application, the
committee's decision is based on factors such as the purpose of the rule being applied, the overall
welfare of the student-athlete, and any competitive advantages that may arise from a granting of a
waiver. See NAT'L COLLEGIATE ATHLETIC ASS'N, ADMiN. REVIEW SUBCOMM. WAIVER
APPLICATION (2004), available at http://wwwl.ncaa.org/eprise/main/administrator/
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The reasoning in support of these rules is not entirely clear. 7 It should
be noted, however, that Division I basketball and Division I-A football are
the revenue producers of the college athletic world. Football and
basketball also generate the bulk of the public interest in collegiate
athletics. More often than not, it is these programs that are the flagships of
a college athletic program. 18 For whatever reasons, the NCAA has chosen
to separate out particular sports for special treatment insofar as transfers
are concerned. The NCAA rules provide other disincentives for athletes
transferring from one Division I program to another. The rules explicitly
prevent coaches from raiding each other's programs.' 9
In short, the NCAA has set up a "price" which must be paid by the
athletes engaged in the specified sports if they want to transfer. While
there is evidence that this deterrent is not always effective,20 the goal of the
NCAA is to ensure that Division I talent in the major revenue generating
sports is spread uniformly throughout the NCAA Division I membership
to protect competitive balance. Open, unrestricted transfers would
somehow disturb competitive balance, according to the NCAA.22
Additionally, the NCAA and its member schools benefit from the
stability inherent in a system of restricted transfers, because once they
have a player signed, they have that athlete there for the duration of his
college career, unless that athlete chooses to pay the price of transferring.
In essence, the school knows what it has in the athlete, and that athlete's
ARS/ARS_Applic.rtf(last visited Apr. 2, 2005). Such waivers are rare, and only the most extenuating
of circumstances warrant a waiver. See generally NCAA BYLAWS, supra note 6, at art. 14.01.3.5
(providing list of narrow exceptions to the anti-transfer rule).
17. Attempts were made to contact the NCAA for a clarification of the reasoning behind the
anti-transfer rules. We were told that unless the inquiry emanated from an athletic administrator, the
NCAA would not address any inquiries.
18. According to a July 10, 2004 Salina (Kansas) Journal article citing the NCAA, attendance at
women's basketball games at some schools even rival that of the men's teams, with attendance
figures exceeding 10,000. Archive of Columns by Chuck Schoffner, http://saljournal.com (last
visited Aug. 30, 2005). For example, in 2003-04, Big XII women's basketball teams averaged 5,381
fans per game, an NCAA record. Id. It was the fourth straight year Big XII women's basketball
averaged more than 5,000 per game. Id. Tennessee averaged over 14,000 fans and Connecticut
averaged 13,435. Id.
19. NCAA BYLAWS, supra note 6, at art. 13.1.1.3.
20. OKLA. STATE UNIV., CowBoY BASKETBALL 2003-2004 ROSTER (2004), available at
http://www.okstate.com/SportSelect.dbml?SPSID=1466&SPID=145&DBOEMID=200&QSEAS
ON=2003 (last visited Feb. 17, 2005). For example, 5 of the 13 members of the 2004 Oklahoma
State men's basketball team, which reached the Final Four, are Division I transfers, including 3
starters. Chip Brown, At Second Chance University, The Door Always is Open Oklahoma State Wins
With Transfers, THE DALLAS MORNING NEWS, Mar. 18, 2004.
21. It is unclear why ice hockey, a sport with little nationwide appeal, is included.
22. See, e.g., NCAA CONST., supra note 5, at art. 2.10. (Article 2.10 promotes the principle of
competitive equity as a goal of the NCAA, so it reasonably follows that any rules promulgated by the
NCAA are in the interest of competitive equity.)
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particular program can "count on" that athlete. The anti-transfer rules
appear to also further empower coaches: coaches know that athletes are
less likely to transfer in light of the disincentives associated with
transferring. Disgruntled athletes cannot easily leave a given institution.
In the eyes of the NCAA, the anti-transfer rule secures the legitimate
interests of coaches, programs, and athletes (who might flee prematurely if
unrestricted).
On its face, the anti-transfer rule operates as a covenant not to
compete. Covenants not to compete generally seek to prevent departing
employees from engaging in competitive activities detrimental to the
interests of the former employer. These restrictions are usually set out in
terms of an activity that is to be restricted over a certain time period and
within certain geographic boundaries. The anti-transfer rules have the
effect of limiting the transferring athlete just as restrictive covenants limit
employees. These rules are thus strikingly similar to common law
covenants not to compete.23
Analyzing the anti-transfer rule as a restrictive covenant makes
perfectly good sense. To begin with, the relationship between an athlete
and the school at which the athlete participates in intercollegiate athletics
is clearly contractual in nature. The North Carolina courts have held that
the relationship between a state university and a student-athlete receiving
financial aid is essentially contractual in nature.24  Likewise, one
commentator has likened the National Letter of Intent,25 a document
signed by athletes after recruitment that binds the athlete to a particular
school, to a restrictive covenant.26
While courts may view the relationship between a student-athlete and
a university as "contractual in nature," they are reluctant to view the
athlete as in fact a party to a viable and enforceable employment contract.
For example, several courts have declined to give workmen's
23. NCAA BYLAWS, supra note 6, at art. 14.5.5.2.10. Unlike a restrictive covenant, the transfer
rule does allow a student to transfer if that athlete is determined to do so and is willing to satisfy the
residency requirement. In enforcement of a restrictive covenant, a competitor is usually enjoined
from the competitive activity outright, although the period of restriction is often a year or less.
24. Taylor v. Wake Forest Univ., 191 S.E.2d 379, 382 (N.C. Ct. App. 1972).
25. Marianne Jennings & Lynn Ziolko, Student-Athletes, Athlete Agents and Five Year
Eligibility: An Environment of Contractual Interference, Trade Restraint and High-Stake Payments,
66 U. DET. L. REv. 179, 192 (1989). The National Letter of Intent program is administered by the
Collegiate Commissioner's Association (CCA), and is comprised of over 500 voluntary institutions.
National Letter of Intent, Overview: What is NLI?, available at http://www.national-
letter.org/overview/ (last visited Apr. 4, 2005). The intent of the program is, quite simply, to ensure
that athletes attend the institutions at which they have committed to play. Id. While the NLI
program seeks to limit athletes to participation at the schools at which they signed, the NLI program
is not sponsored or administered by the NCAA. Id.
26. Jennings & Ziolko, supra note 25, at 192.
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compensation benefits to athletes injured in the course of athletic
participation, sometimes in the face of findings by the state labor
commissions of the particular state that the athletes, as employees, were
indeed entitled to such benefits.27 In some ways this reflects a willful
refusal by the courts to acknowledge things as they really are.28
An examination of the nature of an athletic scholarship reveals a
relationship clearly akin to employment. By accepting a scholarship, the
athlete enters into a legal relationship with the particular educational
institution that grants the award. The athlete agrees to maintain a certain
level of academic performance and perform athletically for the school. At
the same time, the educational institution provides the athlete with tuition,
books, and certain other educational expenses. 29 Undeniably, there exists a
quidpro quo arrangement, and one that is clearly contractual, both in form
and substance with athletic scholarships. Notably, this kind of quid pro
quo arrangement is the earmark of the employee-employer relationship. 3
The reluctance on the part of courts to confront the issue of athletic
scholarships as employment contracts in the workers compensation
context stems from a fear of uncharted waters - scholarships have never
27. See Rensing v. Ind. State Univ. Bd. of.Tr., 444 N.E.2d 1170, 1175 (Ind. 1983) (finding
injured athlete not an "employee" of Indiana State University under the Workmen's Compensation
Act); State Comp. Ins. Fund v. Indus. Comm'n of Colo., 314 P.2d 288, 290 (Colo. 1957) (finding
injured athlete not entitled to benefits under the Workmen's Compensation Act because claimant
failed to carry the burden of showing that the athlete was under contract to play football for Fort
Lewis A&M or that playing football was incident to his part-time employment with the university);
see also Ray Yasser, Are Scholarship Athletes At Big-Time Programs Really University Employees?
- You Bet They Are, 9 NAT'L BLACK L.J. 65 (1984).
28. YASSER ET AL., supra note 4, at 29, n.2.
29. Yasser, supra note 27, at 65.
30. Id. at 69. Notably, NCAA Bylaw 15.3.5 allows athletes to be cut for a lack of skill, which
creates a situation very similar to an at-will employment contract with a one-year duration. NCAA
BYLAWS, supra note 6, at art. 15.3.5. NCAA Division I Bylaw, Article 15.3 governs the terms and
conditions of awarding institutional financial aid to athletes (athletic scholarships). Id. at art. 15.3.
NCAA Division I Bylaw, Article 15.3.3.1 sets out the one-year duration of athletic scholarships,
stating "[w]here a student's athletics ability is taken into consideration in any degree in awarding
financial aid, such aid shall not be awarded in excess of one academic year." Id. at art. 15.3.3.1. Of
course, an athlete's eligibility can be renewed as long as the athlete has eligibility and is deemed by
the institution to have the requisite athletic ability. NCAA Division I Bylaw, Article 15.3.5.1
governs renewals of athletic scholarships, stating: -
The renewal of institutional financial aid based in any degree on athletics ability shall be
made on or before July 1 prior to the academic year in which it is to be effective. The
institution shall promptly notify in writing each student-athlete who received an award the
previous academic year and who has eligibility remaining in the sport in which financial
aid was awarded the previous academic year (under Bylaw 14.2) whether the grant has
been renewed or not renewed for the ensuing academic year. Notification of financial aid
renewals and nonrenewals must come from the institution's regular financial aid authority
and not from the institution's athletics department.
Id. at 15.3.5.1.
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been viewed as "employment contracts" in the traditional sense, despite
their common characteristics. Namely, judicial recognition that the
relationship between athletes and the schools they represent are
employment contracts for worker's compensation purposes could
constitute legal acknowledgment that big-time college athletes are not
amateurs at all.31
For courts to recognize that college athletes are "employees" pursuant
to the Workmen's Compensation Act would challenge the long-held
notion that college athletes play their sports as an avocation.32 Yet, at the
same time, for courts to fail to find that college athletes are not "in the
service of' for workmen's compensation purposes flies in the face of the
plain meaning of those statutory terms. As a dissenting judge of the Court
of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit noted,
[t]he mythological image of the amateur athlete, despite the realities of the
revenue driven world of college athletics, is one cherished by the public, and
not one the courts are ready to destroy. It is consoling to buy into these
myths, for they remind us of a more innocent era - an era where recruiting
scandals were virtually unknown, where amateurism was more a reality than
an ideal.
33
But viewing the anti-transfer rules as covenants not to compete does
not pose the same challenges to the intercollegiate athletic model that
workmen's compensation cases present. Unlike workmen's compensation
cases, which threaten the entire system of intercollegiate athletics, viewing
the anti-transfer rules as covenants not to compete would alter only the
contours of the anti-transfer rules.
Notwithstanding the judicial disingenuousness in refusing to recognize
the athlete-university relationship as employment, the similarities between
the anti-transfer rules and covenants not to compete are too compelling to
be ignored. Accordingly, the question that remains is whether the transfer
rules, if viewed under the lens of the law of restrictive covenants, would
31. Judge Flaum of the Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit has acknowledged this,
observing that "NCAA member colleges are the purchasers of labor in this market, and the players
are the suppliers. The players agree to compete in... games sponsored by the colleges, games that
typically garner the colleges a profit, in exchange for tuition, room, board and other benefits." Banks
v. Nat'l Collegiate Athletic Ass'n, 977 F.2d 1081, 1095 (7th Cir. 1992) (Flaum, J., dissenting).
Judge Flaum, however, seems to be alone in his acknowledgement.
32. The NCAA Division I Constitution defines amateurism as follows:
Student-athletes shall be amateurs in an intercollegiate sport, and their participation
should be motivated primarily by education and by the physical, mental and social
benefits to be derived. Student participation in intercollegiate athletics is an
avocation, and student-athletes should be protected from exploitation by professional
and commercial enterprises.
NCAA CONST., supra note 5, at art. 2.9.
33. Banks, 977 F.2d at 1099 (Flaum, J., dissenting).
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withstand judicial scrutiny. It is our contention that the anti-transfer rules
could not be upheld, given that they are illegal, overly restrictive
covenants not to compete.
II. AN UNSUCCESSFUL CHALLENGE TO THE PAC-l10 CONFERENCE'S
ANTI-TRANSFER SCHEME - TANAKA V. UNIVERSITY OF SOUTHERN
CALIFORNIA34
Rhiannon Tanaka was a very accomplished high school soccer
player.35  Many college coaches agreed.36  A number of Division I
universities heavily recruited Tanaka, including the University of Southern
California ("USC"), a Pacific-10 ("Pac-10") conference member.37 After
meeting with various USC athletic officials, Tanaka signed a National
Letter of Intent to enroll at USC as a high school senior.3s Before signing
the Letter of Intent, Tanaka had asked USC officials about the anti-transfer
rules and was told that she would be free to transfer from USC if she were
unhappy after her freshman year.39
Tanaka attended USC during the 1994-1995 academic year and found
herself entirely dissatisfied with both the soccer program and the quality of
the USC education.40  In particular, Tanaka believed that athletes were
steered to "sham" courses of little academic value.4'
In the spring of 1995, Tanaka decided to transfer to the University of
California at Los Angeles (UCLA), another Pac-10 school.42  She was
impressed by the UCLA soccer program and wanted to stay in the Los
Angeles area.43
At this point, USC steeped in to oppose the transfer under the anti-
transfer rule of the Pac-10. The rule provided that:
[ejach institution, before it permits a student who has transferred directly or
indirectly from, or practiced at, another Pacific-10 member institution to
compete in intercollegiate athletics, shall require the student to fulfill a
residence requirement of two full academic years ... and shall charge the
34. Tanaka v. Univ. of S. Cal., 252 F.3d 1059 (9th Cir. 2001).
35. See id. at 1061.
36. See id.
37. Id. Pac-10 is an association comprised of ten universities formed "for establishing an
athletic program to be participated in by the members." Hairston v. Pacific 10 Conference, 101 F.3d
1315, 1317 (9th Cir. 1996).









student with two years of eligibility in all Pacific-10 sports, and during the
period of ineligibility shall not offer, provide, or arrange directly or indirectly
any earned or unearned athletically related financial aid.
4 5
USC took the position that Tanaka could not play intercollegiate soccer
her first year at UCLA and that she must forfeit a year of eligibility.46
USC also maintained that during Tanaka's first semester at UCLA she was
ineligible for financial aid tied to athletics.4 .
Tanaka challenged the imposition of these sanctions, suing USC in
federal court on both a state law contract claim and a federal antitrust
claim under the Clayton Act.48 Specifically, Tanaka alleged that USC had
violated Sherman Act, 15 U.S.C. § 1.49 Tanaka averred that the imposition
of the penalties amounted to retaliation for publicly raising the issue of
academic fraud at USC.5 0 Noting in her complaint that she was "the only
transferring athlete who had the sanctions imposed on her," Tanaka
emphasized that "[i]n all other instances where student-athletes transferred
from USC, Pacific-10 penalties had not been used."5
The District Court for the Central District of California dismissed the
complaint with prejudice.5 1 It held that the Pac-10 anti-transfer rule was
not susceptible to attack under the Sherman Act because the rule was
effectively "non-commercial., 53 The district court noted further that even
if the Sherman Act applied, Tanaka's claim would fail because the anti-
transfer rule would withstand the "rule of reason" analysis under the
Sherman Act. 4 Having dismissed the federal claim, the district court did
not employ its supplemental jurisdiction over the state law claim. 5
On appeal, the Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit affirmed, but in
so doing, clearly left the door open for a better-reasoned attack on the
NCAA's anti-transfer rules.56 The court noted that USC had applied the
Pac-10 anti-transfer rule, not the NCAA's anti-transfer rule, to Tanaka. 7
45. Id. (quoting Pac-10 Rule C 8-3-b).
46. Tanaka, 252 F.3d at 1061-62.
47. See id. at 1062.
48. Id.
49. Id.
50. Prior to suing USC in federal court, Tanaka had first filed a fraud action in state court that
was unsuccessful. Tanaka, 252 F.3d at 1062.
51. Id. at 1062 (emphasis in original).
52. Id. Notably, the district court initially dismissed Tanaka's complaint with leave to amend in
August 1999. Id. The court dismissed Tanaka's amended complaint in November 1999, which she
then appealed to the Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit. Id.
53. Tanaka, 252 F.3d at 1062.
54. Id.
55. Id.
56. See id. at 1063-65.
57. Tanaka, 252 F.3d at 1065 n.3. For our purposes, it is important to note that Tanaka's case
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Moreover, the court noted that Tanaka undermined any argument that the
Pac-10 transfer rule had the requisite "significant anticompetitive effect
within a relative market" to be actionable under the Clayton Act.
58
By characterizing her case as an "isolated act of retaliation"59
(remember that Tanaka claimed she was the "only one" against whom the
transfer sanctions were applied), Tanaka unwittingly undid her antitrust
claim.60  Furthermore, Tanaka failed entirely to properly define either a
relevant geographical market or a relevant product market.6' Additionally,
Tanaka's "strictly personal preference to remain in Los Angeles" did
nothing to buttress her antitrust claim - antitrust laws, after all, "were
enacted for 'the protection of competition, not competitors.' ,,62 As the
9163court concluded, "Tanaka simply has no antitrust cause of action...
Antitrust claims typically turn on the ability of the plaintiff to
demonstrate significant anti-competitive effects in relative markets. 64 By
contrast, the focus of the state law jurisprudence strictly construing
covenants not to compete is to protect the individual from overly
burdensome restrictions.65  While the court of appeals held that Tanaka's
antitrust claim failed,66 the court never addressed her state law contract
claim.67 Moreover, Tanaka did not base her claim on a covenant not to
challenged the intra-conference transfer rule of the Pac-10. See id. at 1062. The court strongly
implied that its holding did not reach beyond the Pac-10's transfer rule, and thus declined to
comment on the similar NCAA transfer regulations. Id. at 1065.
58. Id. at 1064-65.
59. Id. at 1064.
60. See id. at 1064.
61. Tanaka, 252 F.3d at 1063.
62. Id. at 1063-64 (quoting Atl. Richfield Co. v. USA Petroleum Co., 495 U.S. 328, 338
(1990)).
63. Id. at 1065.
64. Id. at 1063; see also Banks, 977 F.2d at 1087-88.
65. Harlan M. Blake, Employee Agreements Not to Compete, 73 HARv. L. REv. 625, 674
(1960).
66. Courts have indicated that claims seeking relief from eligibility rules will not succeed if
based on antitrust principles. See, e.g., Banks, 977 F.2d at 1089-94 (noting that plaintiff failed to
allege an "anti-competitive effect on a relevant market"). Id. at 1093. Facially, the Banks decision
seemingly left the door open to better drafted antitrust claims: "[w]hile Banks might possibly have
been able to allege an anti-competitive impact on a relevant market through a more carefully drafted
complaint or an amendment to his complaint, he failed to do so. It is not for us, as appellate judges,
to re-structure his complaint for him." Id. at 1094. Yet, given the analysis of the court, the spirit of
Banks suggests that even if presented in a properly drafted complaint, an attack based on anti-trust
principles would fail. See id.
67. Tanaka, 252 F.3d at 1065 n.4. The Tanaka court observed that:
[tihe district court did not abuse its discretion in dismissing Tanaka's state breach of
contract claims without prejudice pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1367(c)(3), which provides that
"district courts may decline to exercise supplemental jurisdiction over a claim.., if... (3)
the district court has dismissed all claims over which it has original jurisdiction."
Id. (quoting 28 U.S.C. § 1367 (c)(3)).
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compete theory. 68 Thus, the Tanaka court did not foreclose or frustrate
contract-based challenges to the NCAA anti-transfer rule. Courts would
likely be receptive, in the right case, to a claim brought by an aggrieved
athlete alleging that the NCAA anti-transfer rule operates as an illegally
restrictive covenant not to compete.69
III. THE COMMON LAW CONCERNING COVENANTS NOT To COMPETE
"The common law's policy against restraint of trade is one of its oldest
and best established."7 °  Though restrictive covenants are primarily a
creature of state law, and thus vary somewhat from state to state, the
judicial principles governing this area of the law are relatively well
established.7 These contracts usually arise as a part of an employment
contract and are designed to limit the ability of an employee to compete
against the employer in the event that the employment is terminated.72
Generally, a promise is unenforceable on the grounds of public policy
if it unreasonably restrains trade.73 A promise is in restraint of trade if its
performance limits competition in any business or restricts a person in the
exercise of gainful occupation.74 Such restraints of trade are unreasonable
if the restraint is greater than is reasonably necessary to protect the
legitimate business interest of the party seeking enforcement of the
covenant.75 Further, even if protecting a legitimate interest, if the need for
protection is outweighed by the hardship to the employee, then the
restraint is unreasonably injurious to the public interest.76 This rule has
been boiled down to a general rule of thumb adopted by the majority of
jurisdictions in the United States: a restraint of trade "is reasonable only if
it (1) is no greater than is required for the protection of the employer, (2)
68. See Tanaka, 252 F.3d at 1062 (noting that the complaint set forth a breach of contract claim
and a claim under the Clayton Act).
69. Id. at 1065 n.4.
70. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS: RESTRAINT OF TRADE introductory note (2004)
[hereinafter RESTATEMENT].
71. Restrictive covenant jurisprudence has traditionally grown from state common law.
However, many states have enacted state constitutional or statutory provisions, which codify
common law principles regarding restraint of trade. See, e.g., GA. CODE ANN. § 13-8-2.1 (2004);
WIS. STAT. § 103.465 (2002).
72. See generally Alliance Metals, Inc. of Atlanta v. Hinely Indus., Inc., 222 F.3d 895, 901
(11th Cir. 2000) (noting that the "language of the non-competition provision demonstrates that
Alliance Atlanta bargained for a commitment from Hinely that he would not start, participate in, or
assist any competitive enterprise for two years after his departure from Alliance Atlanta"); see also
RESTATEMENT, supra note 70, at § 186(2).
73. RESTATEMENT, supra note 70, at § 187.
74. Id. at § 186(2).
75. Id. at § 188 cmt. a.
76. Id.
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does not impose undue hardship on the employee, and (3) is not injurious
to the public. 77
Courts traditionally look with disfavor on restrictive covenants, and
such agreements are usually construed in favor of the party against whom
enforcement is sought.78 An analysis of the terms of the restraint usually
will not begin unless the party seeking enforcement of the covenant meets
a threshold question of whether there is a legitimate business interest the
protection of which makes enforcement of the agreement necessary. 79 The
burden of positively proving a need for protection is on the party seeking
to enforce the covenant.
Thus, the threshold requirement of any restrictive covenant is the
existence of a legitimate protectible business interest on the part of the
party seeking enforcement of the contract.8' Such an interest usually rises
out of concern about the unfairness of allowing the employee to compete
against his or her former employer. An important factor in this assessment
is whether the employee possesses special skills or knowledge that would
make competition unfair. The Supreme Court of Wisconsin has defined
this test as determining whether the competition threatened by the
employee is beyond that "a stranger could give., 82 The Court added that
additional factors such as skill or special relationship with a specific client
base, which would render the restrictive covenant reasonably necessary for
the protection of the employer's business, should also be present.83 If the
competition is greater than that which a stranger could give, there is a
77. Blake, supra note 65, at 648-49.
78, E.g., Hopper v. All Pet Animal Clinic Inc., 861 P.2d 531, 539 (Wyo. 1993) (citing
Commercial Bankers Life Ins. Co. of Am. v. Smith, 516 N.E.2d 110 (Ind. Ct. App. 1987)) (noting
that "[tihe traditional disfavor of such restraints means covenants not to compete are construed
against the party seeking to enforce them").
79, E.g., Lakeside Oil Co. v. Slutsky, 98 N.W.2d 415, 419 (Wis. 1959) (noting that "the first
question to be determined under the rule is whether there is a need for any restriction of the activities
of the defendant for the protection of the plaintiff ... [t]here must be some additional special facts
and circumstances which render the restrictive covenant reasonably necessary for the protection of
the employer's business"). Accord Heyde Cos., Inc. v. Dove Healthcare, LLC, 654 N.W.2d 830, 835
(Wis. 2002) (citing Lakeside Oil Co., 98 N.W.2d at 419) (recognizing that the first element of the
"five-factor analysis" used to ascertain whether a restrictive covenant is enforceable is whether the
restraint is "necessary to protect the employer"). C.f Vt. Elec. Supply Co., Inc. v. Andrus, 315 A.2d
456, 458 (Vt. 1974) (noting that under Vermont law "enforcement will be ordered unless the
agreement is found to be contrary to public policy, unnecessary for protection of the employer, or
unnecessarily restrictive of the rights of the employee, with due regard being given to the subject
matter of the contract and the circumstances and conditions under which it is to be performed").
80. See generally Heyde, 654 N.W.2d at 835 (noting that restrictive covenants are to be
"construed in favor of the employee").
81. RESTATEMENT, supra note 70, at § 187 cmt. b.




protectible business interest, and the threshold is met. The analysis then
would proceed to the reasonableness of the specific terms of the covenant
not to compete, given all the circumstances. This structure is set out by
the Wisconsin courts is representative of many states.84
Once this threshold has been met, the agreement is subjected to a test
of reasonableness.85 The court engages in a balancing test, weighing the
employer's need for protection from unfair competition against the
economic interests of the employee, coupled with the public policy interest
in favor of open competition in a free market economic system. 86 The
competing principles of the freedom to work and the freedom to contract
are thus at odds when courts test the enforceability of restrictive
covenants.87 A restraint of trade will generally be deemed unreasonable if,
absent a statutory authorization or dominant social or economic
justification, the covenant "is greater than required for the protection of the
person for whose benefit the restraint is imposed or imposes undue
hardship upon the person restricted. 88
Despite variations from jurisdiction to jurisdiction, most courts
typically weigh three factors when determining the enforceability of a
covenant not to compete.89 These fairly universal considerations take into
account the geographical reach of the restriction, the duration of the
restriction, and the extent to which the restriction limits the activities of the
employee.90 The test of the reasonableness of a restrictive covenant turns
on a court's view of these factors.9'
A covenant not to compete must be reasonable with regard to its
geographical reach.92 If it covers a geographical area more extensive than
necessary to protect the former employer, it is unreasonable. 93 The aim of
the restriction is to prevent competition that would cause substantial harm
84. The Wisconsin rule is representative of the Restatement rule. Indeed, most jurisdictions
look first to a protectible business interest, including New York, Minnesota, Alaska, Texas,
California, New Jersey and Illinois. See, e.g., Wausau Med. Ctr. v. Asplund, 182 Wis. 2d 274, 283
(Ct. App. 1994); Reed, Rohberts Assoc. v. Strauman, 40 N.Y.2d 303 (1976); Kallok v. Medtronic,
Inc., 573 N.W.2d 356, 361 (Minn. 1998); Metcalfe Invs., Inc. v. Garrison, 919 P.2d 1356, 1362
(Alaska 1996); DeSantos v. Wachenhut Corp., 793 S.W.2d 670, 683 (Tex. 1990); Monogram Indus.,
Inc., v. Sar Indus., Inc., 64 Cal. App. 3d 692, 698 (1976); Whitmyer Bros., Inc. v. Doyle, 58 N.J. 25,
32-3 (1971); Hydroaire, Inc. v. Sager, 98 111. App. 3d 761, 764 (1981).
85. See RESTATEMENT, supra note 70, at § 188 cmt. a.
86. Hopper v. All Pet Animal Clinic Inc., 861 P.2d 531, 539 (Wyo. 1993).
87. Id.
88. Hansen v. Edwards, 426 P.2d 792, 793 (Nev. 1967); see RESTATEMENT, supra note 70, at §
186 cmt a.
89. Blake, supra note 65, at 675-81.
90. Id.
91. Id.
92. Id. at 675-78.
93. RESTATEMENT, supra note 70, at § 188 cmt d.
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to the employer.94 A restriction that has a nationwide reach, for example,
might be broader than necessary.95 When determining the reasonableness
of the geographical restrictions of a restrictive covenant, some courts look
at the nature of the competition in a particular geographical area drawing a
distinction between direct and indirect competition.96 The area in which
the employee principally operates is taken into consideration. 97
Some courts would consider restrictions that cover an area where the
employer does not conduct business broader than necessary for the
protection of the employer.98 The District Court for the Southern District
of Indiana and the Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit are two such
courts. In Ridgefield Park Transp. v. Uhl, the district court examined a
restriction that was nationwide and distinguished what the court called
"indirect" from "direct" competition.99  The court defined "direct"
competition as that which takes place in the employer's traditional area of
operation, while "indirect" competition is competition outside of that
area.100 The court held that a nationwide restriction is overly broad when
the competition with the former employer is indirect.01 In similar fashion,
the Fifth Circuit Court of Appeals held that the "nominal" threat of direct
competition to a business would not support a nationwide restriction on
competition, and that the mere possibility of direct competition across the
nation does not create a protectible interest 
nationwide.' 0
If geographic restrictions are more extensive than necessary to protect
the interests of the former employer, the restriction is too broad and
unenforceable. 10 3 Likewise, if the restraint lasts longer than is required, in
light of the interests of the employer, the restraint is unreasonable.' 4
94. Blake, supra note 65, at 674-76.
95. Id. at 675-76.
96. Id. at 675.
97. Id.
98. Blake, supra note 65, at 675-76.
99. Ridgefield Park Transp. v. Uhl, 803 F. Supp. 1467, 1470 (S.D. Ind. 1992).
100. Id.
101. Id. In Ridgefield, a trucking company sought to enforce a restrictive covenant that would
restrict a buyer of a portion of the business from competing directly or indirectly with the parent
trucking company anywhere in the United States. Id. The seller, while occasionally hauling freight
across the United States, mainly confined its business activities to a handful of clients in the
Indianapolis region. See id.
102. Tandy Brands, Inc. v. Harper, 760 F.2d 648, 653 (5th Cir. 1985). In that case, a mail-order
retailer, which advertised in publications and sold goods across the US and Canada, sought to prevent
a rival who had purchased a portion of the plaintiffs' business from competing with the seller in a
similar nationwide mail-order business. Id. at 650. The court held that the advertisement of business
in nationwide publications does not create a protectible interest in every city in the U.S. and Canada.
Id. at 653.
103. RESTATEMENT, supra note 70, at § 188 cmt d.
104. Id.
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Courts seldom criticize restraints of six months to a year on the grounds of
duration, and even longer restraints are sometimes enforced."i 5
While jurisdictions have yet to agree on a uniform standard for the
reasonableness of durational requirements in restrictive covenants, some
jurisdictions have expressly defined reasonable with regard to temporal
restrictions. The Texas Court of Civil Appeals explains the standard very
succinctly - "[t]wo to five years has repeatedly been held a reasonable
time in a non-competition agreement."'1 6 The United States District Court
for the Western District of Arkansas is even less charitable. The court
stated that, under Arkansas law, "the cases previously cited strongly
indicate that covenants contained in employment contracts which restrict
competition for more than two years are highly suspect and are generally
void as against public policy."' '
Finally, restrictions typically articulate the type of activities the former
employee may not conduct. 08 Generally, a restraint may not be so "broad
as to violate the public policy against unduly limiting... [the employee's]
skill, labor and talent."' 0 9  The covenant not to compete "will not be
enforced if, under all the circumstances, the restraining covenant is unduly
restrictive of the employee's freedom."' 10
In a gestalt approach, restraints of activity affect the reasonableness of
both the spatial and temporal restrictions."' If the activity to be restrained
is highly specialized, of a unique nature, or otherwise sensitive in a
business context, a restraint may be more extensive in spatial and
geographical terms." 2 Conversely, restraints of general or non-specialized
activity must be narrowly tailored in terms of time and place." 3 Thus, the
courts have established a sliding scale: the more narrowly the restrictions
on activities are defimed, the broader the limitations may be in terms of
time and space.' "4 Only in rare cases will restrictions in the broadest terms
be reasonable.
Furthermore, courts weigh other factors as well when determining the
reasonableness of restrictions on activities.' One such factor is whether
105. Blake, supra note 65, at 677.
106. AMF Tuboscope v. McBryde, 618 S.W.2d 105, 108 (Tex. Civ. App. 1981).
107. Stubblefield v. Siloam Springs Newspapers, Inc., 590 F. Supp. 1032, 1035 (W.D. Ark.
1984).
108. Blake, supra note 65, at 677.
109. 6 SAMUEL WILLISTON & RICHARD A. LORD, A TREATISE ON THE LAW OF CONTRACTS §
13:5 (4th ed. 2004).
110. Blake, supra note 65, at 674.
111. Id. at675.
112. Columbia Ribbon & Carbon Mfg. Co., Inc. v. A-I-A Corp., 369 N.E.2d 4, 6 (N.Y. 1977).
113. Id.
114. Id.
115. Blake, supra note 65, at 676.
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the particular activity the employer wishes to restrict is based upon an
employee's natural talent and ability.116 A restriction on such an activity
would be strictly construed. 1 7 On the other hand, if the employer has
spent considerable time and money training the employee, a restriction on
such an activity would be liberally construed.1 8  Courts appear more
willing to restrict the activities of an employee when these skills and
abilities were conveyed to the employee through the former employer's
expense and effort." 9 Likewise, courts been less willing to restrict the
activities of individuals who exhibit unique or special talents. 20  Many
jurisdictions have shown reluctance to restrict an employee's use of his
own natural talents or skills, which are not the result of investment or
effort on the part of the former employer.121 Interestingly, many courts are
unwilling to enforce restrictions against activities of an employee where
the talents and abilities of the employee are considered ordinary, or less
than ordinary, and thus easily replaced. 22
Courts also weigh the hardship an employee would suffer if
restrictions on activities were enforced. 23  Covenants that are overly
burdensome on the employee are usually not enforced. 24 An important
factor is the ability of the employee to pursue a living and the economic
harm the employee would suffer as a result of the enforcement of the
covenant. 2' As the Court of Appeals of New York stated, "[u]ndoubtedly
judicial disfavor of these covenants is provoked by 'powerful
considerations of public policy which militate against sanctioning the loss
of a man's livelihood.' ,,126 Another court states "[r]estrictive covenants
that tend to prevent an employee from pursuing a similar vocation after
termination of employment are disfavored and are strictly construed
against the employer." 27  As always, the hardship on the employee is
weighed against the harm that the employer might suffer. For example, as
Corbin stated, "[b]efore granting an injunction preventing an employee
116. Id.
117. Id.
118. Raimonde v. Van Vlerah, 325 N.E.2d 544, 547 (Ohio 1975).
119. See New River Media Group, Inc. v. Knighton, 429 S.E.2d 25, 26-27 (Va. 1993); Norlund
v. Faust, 675 N.E.2d 1142, 1154 (Ind. Ct. App. 1997); T.K. Communications, Inc. v. Herman, 505
So. 2d 484, 486 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1987).
120. See Cullman Broad. Co. v. Bosley, 373 So. 2d 830, 835 (Ala. 1979).
121. Richmond Bros., Inc. v. Westinghouse Broad. Co., 256 N.E.2d 304, 307 (Mass. 1970); see
also W. Group Broad., Ltd. v. Bell, 942 S.W.2d 934, 938-39 (Mo. Ct. App. 1997).
122. Cullman, 373 So. 2d at 835.
123. Blake, supra note 65, at 676-77.
124. Id.
125. Id.
126. Reed, 353 N.E.2d at 593.
127. Bryceland v. Northey, 772 P.2d 36, 39 (Ariz. Ct. App. 1989).
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from earning his living in his customary trade or employment, the court
should make sure, not only that he contracted to forbear and is guilty of a
breach, but also that the former employer is suffering substantial
harm. ,,128
Moreover, some courts describe additional considerations. For
example, the Supreme Court of Nebraska considers the degree of
inequality in bargaining power between the two parties, the current
employment conditions under which the employee works, and the
necessity of the employee changing his calling or residence.
129
Judicial treatment of restrictive covenants has evolved over time.
Historically, courts flatly outlawed restrictive covenants at common law.
130
Courts viewed such agreements as overly restrictive of trade and against
public policy. 131 Under this view, the particular terms of the restrictive
covenant did not matter greatly because the essence of the covenant itself
sealed its fate.' 32 However, modem case law has signaled a departure from
the old rule of holding any restrictive covenant illegal and recognizes that
such agreements may be enforceable under certain circumstances.
133
Restrictive covenant jurisprudence has evolved to allow enforcement
of covenants that are reasonable in all of its terms. 134  Still,
unreasonableness in one term could void the entire covenant. 13' Formerly,
the rule used to be "all or nothing.' 36 Although this rule is still in effect in
some jurisdictions today,'37 it has led to results of questionable equity, and
the current trend is toward the judicial modification of unreasonable terms
in the covenant. 38
Through judicial modification, the court essentially re-writes the
contract to render it reasonable, and thus enforceable, in its terms. 139 The
courts have two methods of judicial modification. 4 ° The first, and older of
the two, is commonly known as the "blue pencil rule."' 141 Under this
doctrine, the court will enforce a covenant not to compete if the words that
128. CORBIN ON CONTRACTS § 1394 (1st ed. 1962).
129. Johnson & Co. v. Salmen, 317 N.W.2d 900, 904 (Neb. 1982).
130. Mitchel v. Reynolds, 24 Eng. Rep. 347 (Q.B. 1711).
131. WILLISTON & LORD, supra note 109, at § 13:3.
132. Id.
133. Solari Indus., Inc. v. Malady, 264 A.2d 53, 56 (N.J. 1970).
134. WILLISTON & LORD, supra note 109, at § 13:4.
135. Ehlers v. Iowa Warehouse Co., 188 N.W.2d 368, 374 (Iowa 1971).
136. Id. at371.
137. Schultz & Assoc. of the Southeast, Inc. v. Broniec, 236 S.E.2d 265, 269 (Ga. 1977).
138. Ehlers, 188 N.W.2d at 371.
139. Blake, supra note 65, at 681.
140. Ehlers, 188 N.W.2d at 371-72.
141. This term comes out of a line of English cases, beginning in the Eighteenth Century. Blake
supra, note 65, at 681 (citing Chesman v. Nainby, 93 Eng. Rep. 819 (K.B. 1726).
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make the contract unenforceable can be mechanically stricken and still
leave a grammatically meaningful restriction. 4 2  However, the "blue
pencil rule," is contrary to the weight of recent authority. 43
The second, and currently the more commonly accepted method of
judicial modification, is the "rule of reason."' 44 This method is considered
to be a more efficient method of modification, and has been adopted by
many courts today. 45  This doctrine moves away from the mechanical
modification of the "blue pencil" rule and allows the court to modify and
enforce an unreasonable restriction to a degree the court considers
reasonable. 46  Essentially, the court disregards the express provisions of
the contract, and substitutes provisions that it considers reasonable.
Jurisdictions adopting this rule believe that enforcement of the express
provisions, as agreed to by the parties, should be performed whenever
possible without injury to the public or injustice to the parties. 47  This
method respects the freedom of the parties to contract, while allowing
courts to protect public policy where necessary.
IV. A HYPOTHETICAL CHALLENGE
For purposes of discussion, let us hypothesize a fact pattern in which a
plaintiff, named j.p.,148 is a basketball player who has been named to
142. Ehlers, 188 N.W.2d at 371.
143. RESTATEMENT, supra note 70, at § 184 Reporter's note.
144. CORBIN ON CONTRACTS at § 1390. Ehlers, 188 N.w.2d at 371.
145. Id. at § 1390.
146. See id. at § 1390.
147. Ehlers, 188 N.W.2d at 368.
148. The hypothetical J.P. is based very loosely upon the plight of Jason Parker, who played
basketball at the University of Tulsa from 2000 through 2004. Jason's father Johnny is a friend and
colleague of Professor Yasser at the University of Tulsa College of Law. Jason was a high school
star at Memorial High School in Tulsa, where he also excelled academically. He ultimately decided
to stay home and signed a National Letter of Intent with Tulsa in the spring of 2000, when current
Kansas head coach Bill Self was the head coach. Jason never played for Bill Self. Self left Tulsa to
accept the head coaching position at Illinois shortly after Jason signed. As a freshman, Jason played
for Buzz Peterson, who came to Tulsa from Appalachian State. After winning the National
Invitational Tournament in his first year, Peterson left to become the head basketball coach at
Tennessee. Tulsa then hired John Phillips, who is still head coach at Tulsa as of this writing.
Interestingly enough, had Jason decided to transfer in the wake of Self s departure, he
would have fallen victim to the most draconian of anti-transfer rules - one which mandates the loss
of two years of eligibility for an athlete who signs a National Letter of Intent but never enrolls at the
school to which he commits. Paragraph 4 of the National Letter of Intent spells out the fact that
athletes "sign" to play for a school, not a coach. while the National Letter of Intent program is set
out, administered and enforced by the Collegiate Commissioners Association, an entity independent
from the NCAA, the NCAA recognizes Letters of Intent. A departing coach therefore provides no
license to transfer. One final note - Jason had a stellar playing career at Tulsa, and graduated with
high honors. Jason was an academic All-American, and a Western Athletic Conference first team
selection. Jason is now playing professionally, having decided to put on hold his decision to attend
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several All-State teams in his home state of Oklahoma during his senior
year of high school. J.P. is a good student, having qualified to receive an
athletic scholarship based on his high school grades and test scores. 4 9 J.P.
was heavily recruited out of high school, and signed with Sunbelt
University, a mid-level NCAA Division I basketball program with a recent
history of having made it to the NCAA national championship tournament
- "the Dance." 0 Sunbelt is located in Heartland, Arizona, and is a
member of the Southwest Conference. Sunbelt is known as a breeding
ground for successful coaches, with several former coaches going on to
bigger and more prominent schools. One former coach has led his new
team to two national NCAA Division I titles. Coaches typically make
their mark at Sunbelt, and then leave for greener (more financially
lucrative) pastures.'51
J.P. was recruited and signed by Sunbelt head coach Billy Sales.
Within two weeks after signing his National Letter of Intent with Sunbelt,
Coach Sales left Sunbelt to take a more lucrative head-coaching job at a
"big name" school. While J.P. entertained thoughts of leaving Sunbelt
after Sales left, new Sunbelt coach Bip Petersburg convinced J.P. to stay.
After red-shirting his freshman year,1 2 J.P. had a moderately successful
season as a red-shirt freshman, during which J.P. established himself as a
solid reserve guard. Following that season, Petersburg left Sunbelt for a
law school at Vanderbilt.
149. The NCAA would consider J.P. a "qualifier." A "qualifier" is a high school graduate who
has met certain academic qualifications. Such qualifications include having passed a mandated
number of credits in core high school subjects such as math, science and English, as well as
minimum high school grade point average and standardized test scores. NCAA BYLAWS, supra note
6, at art. 14.3.
150. The inspirations for Sunbelt in this hypothetical are schools such as the University of Tulsa
of the Western Athletic Conference or Gonzaga of the West Coast Conference.
151. Again, the University of Tulsa serves as an example. Since the early 1980s, Tulsa has had
several head coaches move on to more prominent jobs after having success at Tulsa. These include
Nolan Richardson and Tubby Smith, who won national titles at Arkansas and Kentucky respectively,
as well as Bill Self of Kansas and Buzz Peterson of Tennessee. UNIV. OF TULSA, 2004 UNIV. OF
TULSA MENS BASKETBALL MEDIA GUIDE 13 (2003). It should be noted, all information in this
footnote was gleaned from interviews with the University of Tulsa Sports Information Director, Don
Tomkalski. This information is readily available generally in the 2004 University of Tulsa Men's
Basketball Media Guide, published by the University of Tulsa Office of Media Relations.
152. To "red-shirt" means that a coach may opt not to play an athlete during a given season, for
reasons such as to let the player develop further, or because of depth at the player's position. NCAA
BYLAWS, supra note 6, at art. 14.2.2.5. The athlete may practice, but may not participate, in any
sanctioned games. Id. at art. 14.2.2.5, art. 14.2.3.1. To participate in an NCAA sanctioned game
would be to "take off the red shirt." Id. at 14.2.3.1. Red-shirting is based on NCAA Bylaw 14.2 and
14.2.1. Bylaw 14.2 deems that an athlete may not participate in more than 4 years of competition,
while 14.2.1 allows those 4 seasons to be fulfilled in 5 calendar years, essentially giving an athlete a
year "to burn" wearing a red shirt if the coach so desires. See generally id. at 14.2 ("Eligibility:
Academic and General Requirements").
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head-coaching job in a major conference. J.P. again chose to stay when
Nate Richards was named head coach at Sunbelt. After playing under
Richards for a year, J.P. decided-to transfer to Catholic University.
Catholic is a private Division I institution located in Baton Rouge,
Louisiana. While Catholic is nationally recognized for the excellence of
its academic programs, it is near the bottom of the ladder in terms of
Division I basketball competitiveness. At Catholic, J.P. reasoned, he could
still play Division I basketball but would receive a much more prestigious
undergraduate degree. J.P. is a practicing Catholic as well, and religious
considerations played a large role in his desire to transfer to Catholic. J.P.
is likely to be the best player on the roster at Catholic. Catholic has never
in its history played a basketball game against Sunbelt or any other teams
in the Southwest Conference, nor has it ever made it to "the Dance."
Unfortunately for J.P., Catholic is only interested in him if he can
come to Baton Rouge with two years of eligibility remaining.
Additionally, because of his lack of success at Catholic, head coach
Edward LeBeau needs J.P. to make an immediate impact in order to save
his job. Because he red-shirted his freshman year and then played for two
years at Sunbelt, J.P. would be able to compete for Catholic for only one
season. Catholic would rather "get more bang for [its] buck" and use the
scholarship J.P. would have received on a promising player who could
make an immediate and longer-term impact.' In short, the residency
requirement of the transfer rules make J.P. unattractive in the eyes of
Catholic, and despite compelling academic, athletic, and religious reasons,
J.P. will be unable to transfer to Catholic unless he has two years of
eligibility remaining.
A. Protectible Interest
As previously noted, the threshold requirement to justify a restrictive
covenant is the existence of a legitimate business interest on the part of the
party seeking enforcement of the contract. 54  In our hypothetical, the
question is whether it would be unfair to allow J.P. to compete against
Sunbelt. The Wisconsin test would appear to indicate that J.P. indeed
poses a competitive threat beyond that "which a stranger could give."' 155
While there is a large pool of athletic talent, the Division I college athlete
possesses skills that are not shared by the community at large.
153. Additionally, J.P. could not receive any athletically based financial aid from Catholic
without a release from Sunbelt. The granting of a release is entirely arbitrary and at the discretion of
the athletic director or coach of the previous institution. See NCAA BYLAWS, supra note 6, at art.
13.1.1.3.




Universities do not recruit just anyone to their athletic programs - they
recruit the most skilled athlete they can persuade to come to their school.
It is perhaps self-evident that an athlete capable of performing at the
Division I level poses a threat of competition to the university sufficient to
satisfy the threshold inquiry.
Having met this threshold, it must now be shown that the specific
provisions of the covenant restricting J.P. in terms of time, geography, and
activity are reasonable. Many courts hold that the provisions of the
covenant are to be strictly construed against the employer. 5 6 While the
threshold requirement is a low bar, the terms of the agreement itself and
the reasonableness of those terms is a substantially more difficult hurdle to
jump.
B. Restrictions on Geography
The transfer rules restrict the transferring athlete in geographical terms
by restricting athletes from transferring to any Division I school in the
nation without satisfying the residency requirement.1 57 In J.P.'s case, the
rule requires J.P. to "complete one full academic year of residence ...
before being eligible to compete for... the member institution .... ,158
Because the NCAA has set forth no express geographical limitation, the
effect is that a transferring athlete is restricted from competing at the
Division I level anywhere in the US without sitting out one year. J.P.
would be subject to a nationwide restriction on his ability to participate in
Division I basketball. Moreover, without a release, J.P. could not receive
financial aid during the year in which he establishes residency.
In theory, J.P. would be competing with Sunbelt if he transfers to
Catholic, since each Division I school is "in the hunt" for a national
championship. In this sense, J.P. would be competing with Sunbelt if he
were to transfer to Catholic. On the other hand, members of the same
conferences compete with the conference rivals directly. Additionally,
schools, with an eye on travel budgets, typically play non-conference
opponents within the same geographical region.' 59 In such circumstances,
the competition would provide yet another example of direct competition.
The competition between Catholic and Sunbelt, however, would be
regarded as indirect. Absent extraordinary circumstances, J.P. is unlikely
to play in a game against Sunbelt. There is only a remote chance of direct
156. Simmons v. Miller, 544 S.E.2d 666, 678 (Va. 2001); Freiberger v. J-U-B Eng'rs, Inc., No.
30104, 2005 WL 674207, at *2 (Idaho Mar. 24, 2005).
157. NCAA BYLAWS, supra note 6, at art. 14.5.1.
158. Id. at art. 14.5.
159. Telephone Interview with Don Tomkalski, Athletic Director, University of Tulsa (Aug. 17,
2004).
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competition with his former school. Catholic and Sunbelt University are
not in the same conference, and are not in the same geographic region of
the country. Indeed, the two schools have never met on the basketball
court. Only in the unlikely event of a tournament pairing would J.P. meet
his former team on the basketball court. J.P.'s transfer poses a minimal
opportunity for direct competition with Sunbelt.
As indicated above, the question of indirect nationwide competition
has been addressed by the United States District Court for the Southern
District of Indiana, which held that that where the competition with the
former employer is indirect, a nationwide restriction is overly broad.1
60
The question of the remote chance of J.P. meeting his former team on the
basketball court in direct competition has likewise been answered by the
Fifth Circuit, in its holding that the "nominal" threat of direct competition
to a business would not support a nationwide restriction on competition.
The mere possibility of direct competition across the nation would not
support a nationwide geographical restriction.161
Under established principles, Division I universities appear to be
overreaching in geographical restrictions on athletes who wish to transfer.
While each school is theoretically in competition with one another for the
same national championship, the likelihood of two schools playing each
other directly, absent geographical or conference factors, is unlikely. In
fact, the chances are much greater that a given school will not compete
directly against another school outside of its conference or region. There
are simply too many programs nationwide to allow for each team to
compete directly with one another. 162  Applying the indirect/direct
competition distinction of the district court, as well as the Fifth Circuit's
ruling on remoteness of possibility of direct competition, it is clear that the
anti-transfer rule and its nationwide geographical restriction would not
withstand judicial scrutiny if viewed as a restrictive covenant.
C. Restrictions on Time
As previously noted, the anti-transfer rule requires an athlete like J.P.,
who transfers from one Division I basketball program to another, to satisfy
a year of residency before being allowed to compete. 163 In effect, the
athlete must sit out a year.' 64 In addition, scholarship assistance is not
permitted while establishing residency unless a release from the former
160. Ridgefield Park Transp. v. Uhl, 803 F. Supp. 1467, 1470 (S.D. Ind. 1992).
161. Tandy Brands, Inc. v. Harper, 760 F.2d 648, 653 (5th Cir. 1985).
162. Approximately 325 schools play Division I basketball. With a few exceptions, the NCAA
limits each school to 28 regular season games. NCAA BYLAWS, supra note 6, at art. 17.5.5.1.




school is obtained. 1
65
To analyze the durational limitations of the anti-transfer rule as a
restrictive covenant, it makes sense to discuss the "lifespan" of a typical
college athlete. In general, restrictive covenants in an employment
contract restrict former employees from competition for a fraction of that
employee's working life. 16  So, a person who works from age 22 might be
expected to enjoy a work life of over 40 years. In tort law, damages for
impairment of earning capacity typically make reference to expectations in
regard to one's "work life." J.P., however, has a much shorter "work life."
The NCAA mandates that an athlete may not engage in more than four
seasons of intercollegiate competition in any one sport.167 In effect, this
makes the "work life" of the Division I athlete four years. Additionally,
athletes rarely transfer from one school to another without having spent at
least one season at the original institution.
161
Most courts require that restrictive covenants have reasonable
durational limits. The Texas court, for example, has expressly stated that
two to five years is acceptable. 169 In contrast, Arkansas law, as interpreted
by the federal district court, frowns upon restrictions of more than two
years. 170 A five-year restriction, the most restrictive approved by either
the Texas or the Arkansas courts, still restricts employees from
competitive activity for 12.5% of their "work life," assuming that the
employee works for 40 years.
By contrast, the anti-transfer rule, in forcing athletes like J.P. to sit out
one year, effectively takes 25% of the athlete's "working life." '171 Thus,
165. Id. at 15.01.5.
166. See generally, e.g., Deutsche Post Global Mail, Ltd. v. Conrad, No. 03-2504, 2004 U.S.
App. LEXIS 24249, at *7 (4th Cir. Nov. 19, 2004) (unpublished decision) (stating that restrictive
covenants are enforceable under Maryland law only if they are reasonable in their "scope and
duration" and they are "no broader than is reasonably necessary to protect [the employers'] legally
protected interest"); Ticor Title Ins. Co. v. Cohen, 173 F.3d 63, 69 (2d Cir. 1999) ("whether a
restrictive covenant not to compete is enforceable [under New York law] ... depends in the first
place upon whether the covenant is reasonable in time and geographic area").
167. NCAA BYLAWS, supra note 6, at art. 14.2. NCAA mandates that these years of eligibility
be completed within five years. Id. at art. 14.2.1.
168. The Five-Year Rule provides one year "to waste." In theory, the extra year provided by the
Five-Year Rule could be spent satisfying the residency requirement. However, because many
athletes spend their freshman year as a "Red Shirt" at the school from which they wish to transfer,
that extra year has been spent. Moreover, as previously noted, an athlete who signs a National Letter
of Intent but never attends the school at which he signs loses two years of eligibility. See infra note
173.
169. See, e.g., Deutsche Post Global Mail, 2004 U.S. App. LEXIS 24249, at *7; Cohen, 173
F.3d at 69; AMF Tuboscope, 618 S.W.2d at 108.
170. Stubblefield v. Siloam Springs Newspapers, Inc., 590 F. Supp. 1032, 1035 (W.D. Ark.
1984).
171. That is, if a player has four years to play, and must sit out one of those four satisfying a
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the anti-transfer rule with its one-year residency requirement works to
deprive the transferring athlete of twice what even the Texas court found
to be the outer limits of reasonableness, Absent the most extraordinary of
circumstances, courts uniformly reject covenants that would restrict an
employee from competition for 25% of his working life. 7 2 Clearly, when
Texas and Arkansas law is applied to the anti-transfer rule as a restrictive
covenant, the anti-transfer rule fails the test of reasonableness.
D. Restriction on Activity
The restrictions on activity in the anti-transfer rule are unique
restrictions in the universe of restrictive covenants. The NCAA, through
its anti-transfer rules, does not entirely preclude transferring athletes from
participating. The anti-transfer rule, as previously noted, affects athletes
who transfer from one Division I program to another. Therefore, J.P.
would not be prohibited from playing basketball, just not at the Division I
level. J.P. would be free to compete at the Division I-AA level or lower.
J.P. can play only by agreeing to "play down" or perhaps playing at a
school that is not a member of the NCAA.' 73 This difference, however,
would not immunize the anti-transfer rule from attack on restrictive
covenant grounds. Rather, it appears to render the anti-transfer rule more
vulnerable based on public policy considerations.
The anti-transfer rule would be repugnant to public policy as overly
burdensome. First, the rule restrains J.P. from using his natural skills and
talents to his own best advantage. The policy underlying the judicial
treatment of restrictive covenants is that people should be relatively free to
apply their trade. 74 Therefore, restrictions must be narrowly drawn. The
anti-transfer rule, in J.P's case, operates to significantly restrict his
freedom to utilize his talents and skill. Additionally, another policy behind
the judicial treatment of restrictive covenants concerns the extent to which
the employer can claim credit for developing the skills and ability of the
residency requirement, he has lost 25% of his "working life" as a college athlete.
172. Interestingly, the district court in Stubblefield went on to say that a "ten-year
covenant.. would obviously be an unreasonable restraint of trade and [would be] void."
Stubblefield, 590 F. Supp. at 1035. The ten-year restriction rejected by the district court would be
slightly less than 25% of the 43 year working life of the average person. See supra note 171.
173. See NCAA BYLAWS, supra note 6, at art. 14.5. The transfer rule applies only to athletes
transferring from one Division I program to another, and athletes transferring to lower NCAA
divisions are beyond the reach of the rule. See id. at art. 14.5.5.2.10(a). Additionally, athletes who
transfer to schools that are not members of the NCAA, such as National Association of
Intercollegiate Athletics members, are likewise unaffected by the NCAA transfer rules. See id. at art.
14.5.5.2.10(d).
174. Reed, Roberts Assoc., Inc. v. Strauman, 353 N.E.2d 590, 593 (N.Y. 1976); see also
RESTATEMENT, supra note 70, at § 186(2).
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person it seeks to restrain. In this connection, Sunbelt cannot be viewed as
having done much by way of developing J.P.'s ability sufficient to justify
its power to limit J.P. from playing ball at another Division I school. The
anti-transfer rule is overly burdensome in restricting J.P. from using his
inherent ability and skill. J.P.'s abilities cannot be fairly said to result
from Sunbelt's goodwill, investment, or expenditure.
In J.P.'s case, the restriction on the use of his natural athletic ability
threatens dual harm. First, J.P. could very well suffer economic harm.
Division I is the highest level of amateur collegiate athletics, and therefore
receives the most attention from the public, the media, and the professional
ranks. Athletes who excel at the highest level of competition have the best
chance of being noticed and subsequently playing professionally.1
75
Players who excel at a lower level are viewed with suspicion by the
professional leagues. Their accomplishments are somewhat tainted
because of the "easier" level of competition. Thus, despite J.P.'s obvious
ability to excel in Division I men's basketball, he is being pushed out of
Division I play by the rules. Restraining J.P.'s ability in this way would
provoke "judicial disfavor ... by 'powerful considerations of public
policy, which militate against sanctioning the loss of a man's livelihood.'
,,176
Secondly, the consuming public has an interest in viewing high quality
intercollegiate athletic competition. A considerable amount of money is
spent each year in support of Division I athletic programs. For example, in
1999 CBS signed an eleven year, six billion dollar contract with the
NCAA to televise the annual Division I men's basketball championship
tournament. 177  The anti-transfer rules force Division I athletes, such as
J.P., to play at a lower level of competition. This harms the quality of
product put on the field by the schools. 178 The anti-transfer rule operates
175. According to the National Basketball Association's official website, of American players
drafted in the first round of the NBA draft since 2000, 95 of 116 were athletes that attended a
Division I school. Of the remaining 21 American players drafted, 2 have come from junior colleges,
and 19 have come from the high school ranks. NBA History, NBA Draft: Complete First Round
Results - 2000-2003, available at http://www.nba.com/history/draft-roundl_2000s.html (last visited
Apr. 6, 2005). Any high school basketball player drafted in the first round is a phenomenal athlete
and would have been able to attend a Division I school, assuming that athlete was academically
eligible. It is unclear whether the two junior college draftees attended junior college due to academic
deficiencies or otherwise.
176. Reed, 353 N.E.2d at 593.
177. CNN, March Money Madness: CBS Sports to Spend $6 Billion over 11 years for Basketball
Tourney (Nov. 18, 1999), available at http://money.cnn.com/1999/11/18/news/ncaa/.
178. A good example of the competitive benefits of allowing the free transfer of athletes is the
granting of a transfer waiver for the members of the scandal-stricken Baylor men's basketball team in
the fall of 2003. Each of the three transfer students went on to find success at other programs. John
Lucas, Jr. transferred to Oklahoma State, where he led the team to a Big XII title, Big XII tournament
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also to reduce the number of years an athlete can compete. Because the
NCAA is artificially restraining talent, the public interest is implicated.
Therefore, "[w]hatever is injurious to the interests of the public is void, on
the grounds of public policy."
1 79
These restrictions on activity are therefore illegal, due to public policy
considerations of harshness on the employee and damage to the consuming
public.'80 Coupling these oppressive activity restrictions with the fact that
the geographical restrictions are nationwide, restrict indirect competition,
and are of a duration equaling a substantial portion of an athlete's
"working" life, a court might likely conclude that the transfer rules fail the
test of reasonableness under well-established restrictive covenant
jurisprudence."'
E. Collateral Considerations
Finally, there are the "collateral considerations." These considerations
include bargaining power, employment conditions, and the reasons for the
employee in changing his calling or residence.18 2 In a contractual sense,
athletes such as J.P. simply have no bargaining power once they sign with
a Division I school and come under the purview of the transfer rule. If the
athlete wishes to compete at the Division I level in one of the sports
affected by the anti-transfer rule, that athlete simply must acquiesce to the
demands of the NCAA. The athlete has no power to negotiate, and is
faced with a "take it or leave it" proposition. While the athlete may
choose a different school, if that school is a member of the NCAA and
participates at the Division I level, the anti-transfer rule is applicable
wherever the athlete may go. The only alternative for the athlete is to
forgo participation at the Division I level and participate at the Division I-
AA or lower level, or at a school that is not a member of the NCAA at all.
Clearly, athletes such as J.P. have little bargaining power. To suggest that
J.P. could have bargained about the terms of the anti-transfer rules is
disingenuous at best.
championship and Final Four appearance in 2004. UNIV. OF OKLA, 2004 UNIV. OF OKLA. MENS
BASKETBALL MEDIA GUIDE 32 (2003). Lawrence Roberts transferred to Mississippi State and was
named Southeastern Conference Player of the Year and was named to several All-American teams.
MISS. STATE UNIV., 2004 MIss. STATE UNIV. MENS BASKETBALL MEDIA GUIDE 29 (2003). Kenny
Taylor transferred to Texas and was a solid contributor off the bench for a team that eventually
reached the Sweet 16. UNIV. OF TEX., 2004 UNIV. OF TEX. MENS BASKETBALL MEDIA GUIDE 38
(2003).
179. Homer v. Graves, 131 Eng. Rep. 284 (C.P. 1831).
180. See generally Blake, supra note 65, at 648-49.
181. See generally id.
182. Johnson & Co. v. Salmen, 317 N.W.2d 900, 904 (Neb. 1982).
[Vol. 15.2
NCAA Anti-Transfer Rules
Additionally, the NCAA rarely takes into consideration the conditions
within the program under which the player participates. 83 The NCAA has
granted transfer waivers in extreme circumstances. 8 4 The NCAA does not
grant waivers for athletes in J.P.'s situation, where the coach who did the
recruiting leaves the program and takes another job. J.P. never played for
the coach with whom he signed, and in the simplest terms, the NCAA does
not care. It is not a relevant consideration in the eyes of the NCAA.
The NCAA anti-transfer rule also fails to take into consideration a
player's personal reasons for desiring to transfer. J.P. for instance, wishes
to transfer in part due to his religious preference of attending a Catholic
school. This is not a relevant consideration to the NCAA.
Likewise, the NCAA fails to consider the status of a program or the
conditions under which a player is forced to stay at the original institution.
For example, if a school is on NCAA-mandated probation, the athlete is
forced to languish in the crippled program. Absent an express waiver from
the NCAA, the player must satisfy the residency requirement unless the
length of the term of probation exceeds the number of years the athlete has
left in eligibility.185 And if a player's scholarship is not renewed because
the school has decided the athlete lacks skill, the athlete still must sit out a
year upon transfer to another Division I program. 186
If the NCAA does not normally grant waivers in these situations, it
certainly is not likely to grant one for lack of playing time or general
dissatisfaction with the program. This rigidity is at cross-purposes with
the NCAA's professed concern for both the well being of student athletes
and competitive balance. Even if J.P. wants to transfer simply to play
more, is it undesirable to let him do so? If J.P. is stuck on the bench at
Sunbelt, he is a net athletic loss to the Division I men's basketball
landscape. His talent would be unused and wasted. If J.P. and athletes
like him were allowed to transfer to other, perhaps weaker programs, the
overall competitive balance of Division I basketball would be enhanced.
In J.P.'s case, his status as a student-athlete would be enhanced. He has a
well thought-out plan to play at a more prestigious university.
In terms of its restrictions on activities, geography, and time, the anti-
183. See generally NCAA BYLAWS, supra note 6, at art. 14 (neither probation for NCAA
violations nor the departure of a coach are included in Article 14.5's narrow list of circumstances
under which a player may transfer).
184. Again, a good example is the granting of a transfer waiver for the three former Baylor
basketball players. See also supra note 16.
185. NCAA BYLAWS, supra note 6, at art. 14.8.1.2(c).
186. Id. at 15.3.3.1. The NCAA has deemed that scholarships are of a one-year duration. Id..
While the school cannot terminate the scholarship of an athlete in mid-season due to a lack of skill or
for any reason other than those falling within a narrow set of exceptions, a school may terminate a
scholarship for nearly any reason at the conclusion of a season. See id. at 15.3.3.1.
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transfer rule as applied to J.P. appears to be unreasonable. The restrictions
are overbroad, do not protect the interests of the universities, and threaten
unreasonable harm to both the athlete and the consuming public.
Therefore, Rule 14.5 of the NCAA Division I bylaws would be void if
properly viewed as a restrictive covenant.
V. THE WORLD OF BIG TIME INTERCOLLEGIATE ATHLETICS IN THE ERA
OF LESS RESTRICTIVE TRANSFERS
We contend that the existing anti-transfer scheme is unreasonably
restrictive. So the next question is, what are the consequences of the
invalidation of the current anti-transfer rules? We believe that a less
restrictive set of anti-transfer rules will have a number of beneficial effects
in the world of big-time intercollegiate athletics. In this concluding
section, we explore those effects. We also lay out a less restrictive
alternative set of transfer rules that better serves the avowed purposes of
the anti-transfer limitations, without unduly restricting the rights of
student-athletes.1 87
The oft repeated and much ballyhooed incantations of the NCAA
about "student-athletes" ring a bit hollow when athletes are singled out for
special treatment. The limitation on the right to transfer is a clear example
of this disparate treatment. Why shouldn't athletes have the same right to
transfer as other students? If a "regular" student is disgruntled about the
quality of his or her educational experience, transferring makes perfectly
good sense. If a "regular" student comes to the conclusion that attending
another institution will in the long run, enhance his or her life, transferring
makes good sense. Does it make any sense to limit athletes to a greater
degree than "regular" students? We contend that the rationales in support
of the freedom to transfer that hold sway insofar as regular students are
concerned have just as much force when applied to student-athletes.
Student-athletes are, after all, students first and athletes second. Treating
them as students when it comes to transferring strengthens the notion that
they are indeed student-athletes.
We also maintain that a less restrictive transfer regime will result in
better coaching and treatment of athletes within a given program. As
things stand now, "blue-chip" athletes are wooed in the recruiting process
and then held captive once they "commit." These binding commitments
provide carte blanche for coaches to engage in behavior entirely foreign to
the academic experience. The stories about abusive coaching are more
than anecdotal. We do not contend that all or even most Division I
187. See NCAA CONST., supra note 5, at art. 1.3.1; see generally id. at art 2.2 ("Principles for
Conduct of Intercollegiate Athletics").
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coaches engage in abusive practices. But we do assert that a clearly
perceptible thread of abuse is woven into the coaching fabric at the most
competitive levels of intercollegiate sport.'88 If athletes were free to leave,
coaches would be a bit more careful. While we believe that athletes
should be treated like students, we also believe in the corollary - coaches
should behave like teachers. 8 9
Finally, a less restrictive transfer system would lead to greater
competitive balance in the NCAA. Student-athletes who desire to transfer
to "get more playing time" should not be discouraged from doing so. The
current construct looks with a jaundiced eye at an athlete who wants to
transfer for this reason. In the current transfer context, this is not a valid
reason to transfer - it receives no consideration from the NCAA as a
relevant circumstance. But in the interest of competitive balance, doesn't
it make sense to freely allow such a transfer? Aren't the interests of
competitive balance better served when an athlete like J.P. plays at
Catholic rather than sitting on the bench at Sunbelt?' 90
188. Unfortunately, recent history is replete with examples of abuse of players by coaches.
Consider former Indiana head men's basketball coach Bobby Knight, who's explosive behavior and
player abuse led to his firing from that program. CNN Sports Illustrated, Knight's Out: Coach's
Tirade Overshadowed Titles Until The End, available at http://sportsillustrated.cnn.com/basketball/
college/news/2000/09/l0/iuknight_ap/ (last visited Apr. 11, 2005). Former University of
California-Berkeley men's basketball coach Lou Campanelli was fired after an abusive post-game
speech to his players. Campanelli v. Bockrath, 100 F.3d 1476, 1478 (9th Cir. 1996). Arizona State
head football coach Frank Kush was fired after striking a player following a poor punt. CNN Sports
Illustrated, Going Home Again: Former Kush Bask at Arizona State, available at http://sport
sillustrated.cnn.com/football/college/news/2000/07/26/kush-returnsap/ (last visited Apr. 11, 2005).
Rutgers men's basketball head coach Kevin Bannon was sued for state and federal civil rights
violations after making his players participate in "strip free-throw shooting" in which the losers ran
wind-sprints naked. The case has since been dismissed. Rutgers Fires Bannon After Last Place
Finish (Mar. 21, 2001), available at http://espn.go.com/ncb/news/2001/0320/1158722.html. Baylor
head men's basketball coach Dave Bliss resigned in 2003 following allegations of drug use by team
members, improper financial aid and a plot to portray a player murdered by a teammate as a drug
user. SI.com, Total Shakeup: Bliss, AD Resign from Baylor, available at http://sports
illustrated.cnn.com/basketball/college/news/2003/08/08/bliss-resigns-ap/ (last visited Apr. 11,
2005). Finally, in an extreme case of willful neglect of a program, University of Oklahoma head
football coach Barry Switzer was responsible for a program in which players were variously involved
in rape, shooting of teammates, and drug trafficking - all within a span of months in 1988. Texas
Sports, OU Breaks Ground on Complex Named for Switzer (Apr. 19, 1997) available at
http://www.texnews.com/texsports97/swit04l997.html.
189. Consider an instance in which a professor in a classroom setting engages in behavior similar
to that of some coaches. It is highly unlikely that such actions would be tolerated.
190. Consider Arizona Cardinals quarterback Josh McCown, who at the time of this writing has
been named the starter for the 2004 season. See Arizona Cardinals, at http://www.azcards.com
/team/playerbio.hmil ?iid=1 14. McCown finished his college career at Sam Houston State, an
NCAA Division I-AA school, after three years at Southern Methodist University, a Division I school.
Id. He left SMU to go to a more passer-friendly offensive system where he could better showcase his
passing skills. Id. In three years at SMU, McCown threw for 4,022 yards and 24 touchdowns. Id. In
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In the final analysis, we believe that the current anti-transfer rules are
illegal covenants not to compete. We also assert that the best system
would simply treat student-athletes as students when it comes to
transferring. But we should also pointout that a less restrictive set of anti-
transfer rules might well pass muster as reasonable restrictive covenants.
As we have previously noted, under the "rule of reason," modem courts
may disregard the express provisions of restrictive covenant, which are
unreasonable, and substitute provisions that it considers reasonable. So it
is entirely possible that a court might craft new, less restrictive, more
reasonably tailored anti-transfer rules. The contours of such newly crafted
rules would be more narrowly drawn geographical and temporal
restrictions. For example, a residency requirement might be imposed upon
a student-athlete who transfers to a school within the conference or to a
historical rival. This could be viewed by a court as consistent with the
covenant not to compete jurisprudence distinguishing direct from indirect
competition.' 9 Admittedly, a court crafting new rules might choose to
shorten the length of time required to establish residency. Requiring that
student-athletes who transfer to a direct competitor sit out a number of
games, or a semester, is certainly more defensible than the current
requirement to sit out a full year. The point is, the now-operational anti-
transfer system is, we believe, illegal.
his one season at Sam Houston, McCown threw for 3,481 yards and 32 touchdowns. Id. McCown
went on to be drafted in the third round by the Arizona Cardinals and was the fourth quarterback
chosen. Id. Had McCown been able to transfer to another Division I-A school, he undoubtedly
would have improved that program and by extension, the competitive balance of the Division I-A
football landscape. Id.
191. RESTATEMENT, supra note 70, at § 188 cmt d.
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